Introduction
These statements by the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and the former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, raise high hopes for transitional justice and Afghan women. They lead to the question of how can transitional justice in Afghanistan best address past abuses, in particular gender-based abuses? Is there a path?
The aim of transitional justice 3 is to halt the culture of impunity by providing accountability for the past and preventing abuses in the future. Transitional justice means those measures by which a society accounts for past abuses as it moves on a path from conflict, apartheid or dictatorship, where the perpetrators of violence enjoy impunity, to civil peace, where the new regime seeks to provide justice and security to its citizens: B. Rubin, 'Transitional justice and human rights in Afghanistan', 79 International Affairs (2003) p. 567. These measures include constitution-making, amnesty agreements, truth ation to address and investigate serious human rights abuses lies with the government of the State where crimes took place. But the international community has an obligation to assist in this process because crimes, such as crimes against humanity, are considered to be crimes against the international community itself. Over the twenty-three years, almost every part of the civilian population suffered such crimes, regardless of geography, tribe, ethnicity, or religion. 6 commissions, lustration processes and prosecutions and courts, whether they be international, hybrid or local. All these measures are vehicles for social reconstruction. 4 Under international law, Afghanistan has the responsibility to investigate whether crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes against international law have occurred. Where there is sufficient admissible evidence, it has the obligation to prosecute them in some form. This is a logical extension of State responsibility. For example, in the Janes Claim, Mexico was held responsible not for the death of Janes at the hands of private individuals but because it had failed to apprehend and punish those individuals. " [I] n these types of case, the state is responsible because it has violated an additional primary obligation of its own, even though the trigger for that obligation lay in the non-attributable act of an individual. It must not be forgotten, therefore, that 'state responsibility' can arise even in cases where the initial act is not attributable to the state": M. 
